



FTR Underfunding Review

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Moving FTRs to an external exchange to manage credit risk raises concerns with underfunding congestion accounting and related market impacts

- **Key Takeaways**

- There is no guarantee for full ARR/FTR funding, however SFT is designed to ensure revenue adequacy under normal conditions
- PJM FTRs are settled using a weekly month-to-date settlement process
- Chronic FTR underfunding can lead to risk premiums in auction bids which can impact ARR value
- Open questions if potential future underfunding creates unintended consequences with Nodal Exchange proposal


- Test to ensure that all subscribed transmission entitlements are within the capability of the existing transmission system
- Test to ensure the PJM Energy Market is revenue adequate under normal system conditions
- **NOT** a system reliability test
- **NOT** intended to model actual system conditions

- FTR cost is determined from the comprehensive results of the auctions
 - charges and credits calculated daily, equally over lifetime of FTR
 - auction charges fund daily ARR target credits
- FTR value is determined from the hourly results of the day-ahead market
 - DA congestion revenues used to fund FTR target credits
- More information see Annual Training (slides 108-120):

<https://www.pjm.com/-/media/training/core-curriculum/ip-arr-ftr-annual/annual-ftr-arr-training.ashx?la=en>

- End-of-month settlement process uses excess collected from planning period to-date to fund any deficient hours or carried forward to the next month within the planning period
 - Books close at the end of each planning period (May billing statements)
- Any surplus funds are returned pro-rata to positive ARR target credits
 - Includes surplus DA congestion, auction revenues, market-to-market congestion
- All positive FTR target credits get a ratio share of underfunding if any exists at the end of the planning period to create a PJM-wide uniform deficiency ratio (uplift charges and credits)
 - Has not happened since May 2014
 - ARR target credits have never been underfunded

Assume planning period one hour with two effective FTRs and no surplus auction or m2m revenues



- DA congestion revenue collected = \$100
 - FTR 1 A – B; TGT CR = \$100
 - FTR 1 pay out = \$90
 - FTR 2 C – D; TGT CR = \$50
 - FTR 2 pay out = \$10
 - FTR revenue adequacy = 67%
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- FTR 1 uplift credit = \$100 - \$90 = \$10
 - FTR 2 uplift credit = \$50 - \$10 = \$40
 - Total uplift credits = \$50
 - FTR 1 uplift charge = $(\$100 / \$150) * \$50 = \33.34
 - FTR 2 uplift charge = $(\$50 / \$150) * \$50 = \16.67

If there is interest in pursuing the Nodal Exchange model, congestion accounting would need to be adjusted

- In the previous example, if FTR A-B or C-D is novated to nodal exchange, PJM would not have enough congestion revenues to pay futures positions
 - PJM to tap credit line to cover potential; twice-a-day variation margin payments
 - PJM accounting practices would need to change to account for imbalances
- **Discussion question:**
 - If FTRs novated to Nodal Exchange are **not** subject to underfunding, does that cause rippling effects / unintended consequences in the market?
 - i.e. bid low and novate to avoid underfunding